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Abstract
One of the proposed strategies for implementation of reducing emissions from
deforestation and forest degradation plus (REDD+) is to incentivize conser-
vation of forests managed by communities under decentralized forest man-
agement. Yet, we argue that this is a challenging road to REDD+ because of
three general characteristics of forests under existing decentralized manage-
ment regimes. First, these forests already accumulate biomass and, in some
cases, generate leakage, which threatens to undercut REDD+ additionality.
Second, these forests are many and small, which will drive up REDD+ trans-
actions costs. Third, beyond the “conservation islands” represented by forests
under decentralized management, processes of deforestation and forest degra-
dation continue. Given these challenges, we argue that REDD+ efforts through
decentralized forestry should be redirected from incentivizing further conser-
vation of forests under existing decentralized management arrangements to-
ward a push for extending the coverage of forests under decentralized man-
agement, making forest rights the hard currency of REDD+.
Introduction
REDD+ broadly denotes policies and interventions aim-
ing to mitigate climate change through reducing emis-
sions from deforestation and forest degradation and the
role of conservation, sustainable management of forests,
and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing
countries. The underlying notion is that by creating fi-
nancial value for forest-based carbon, actors managing
forests in developing countries will perceive an incentive
to reduce emissions from forested lands. REDD+ contin-
ues to be negotiated under the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change’s post-Kyoto agree-
ments. Currently, ongoing REDD+ readiness activities
and pilot projects are financed mainly through bilateral
and multilateral arrangements, the latter including the
World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Facility and the
United Nations (UN)-REDD Program.
In developing countries with existing decentralized for-
est management policies, the introduction of REDD+ has
implied a focus on incentivizing further conservation of
forests under decentralized management. This is reflected
in, among other, the REDD+ policies and pilot projects
of Nepal (GoN 2010), the Philippines (Phelps 2010),
Tanzania (UN-REDD Programme 2009), Mexico (UN-
REDD Programme 2012), Ethiopia (The REDD Desk
2013), and Cambodia (Lang 2013). In Tanzania, for
instance, six of the nine REDD+ pilot projects di-
rectly work with incentivizing conservation by commu-
nities or preparing communities to receive incentives
(TNRF 2011). Furthermore, an inventory of first gener-
ation REDD+ projects in Indonesia (35 projects), Brazil
(20 projects), and the Democratic Republic of Congo
(4 projects), shows as a common pattern that propo-
nents are developing REDD+ pilot projects in forests
where they previously ran various forms of conservation-
oriented projects, including decentralized management
(Sills et al. 2009). Similarly, forests under decentralized
management contribute to the voluntary carbon offset-
ting market (Vickers et al. 2012). An example is a REDD
project in Oddar Meanchey province in Cambodia that
was set up in 2008 linking 13 existing community forests
covering a total of 67,783 ha with the voluntary car-
bon market and a private company is marketing carbon
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projects generated by this project (Lang 2013). Another
example is the Kasigau Corridor REDD+ project that has
gained a Verified Carbon Standard (VCS) validation for
its forest conservation and regeneration activities on land
owned by indigenous community ownership groups in a
wildlife corridor between the Tsavo East and Tsavo West
National Parks in Kenya (Wildlife Works 2013).
Thus, it seems reasonable to argue that in countries
with decentralized forest management policies, REDD+,
in policy and not least practice as evidenced in a host
of pilot projects, focuses on incentivizing conservation
in existing forests under decentralized management. Yet,
this specific focus, as it appears currently, has challenges,
which we will demonstrate below, and should, in our
view, give way to a focus on rights-oriented reforms.
The merits of decentralized forest
management
Decentralized forest management denotes the entrust-
ment of powers over forest resources to a local repre-
sentative authority. Urged forward by promises of ef-
fective and equitable conservation, decentralization has
spread over the past three decades through legal reforms
and implementation efforts and today around 9–10% of
the World’s total forest area is formally owned by com-
munities and indigenous groups, whereas these groups
have formal user rights to another 2–3% (Sunderlin et al.
2008). However, there is variation in extent of powers
devolved, local enforcement, forest types and sizes, and
coverage of decentralized management between coun-
tries (Balooni & Inoue 2007; Agrawal et al. 2008; Ribot
et al. 2010).
There is substantial evidence that forests under decen-
tralized management are indeed conserved, irrespective
of continent, country, and forest type and size (Nagendra
2007; Somanathan et al. 2009; Bowler et al. 2012). Decen-
tralized forest management is associated with improving
forest conditions measured in terms of tree species diver-
sity, crown cover, volume of trees per ha, tree density,
and basal area (Bowler et al. 2012). Such outcomes are
attributed to higher levels of local enforcement (Chha-
tre & Agrawal 2008) and monitoring (Nagendra 2007)
of forests under decentralized management. In terms of
livelihood benefits, the other major policy goal of decen-
tralized forest management, the evidence is more mixed,
albeit with a tendency toward negative livelihood out-
comes, in particular for poor and forest-dependent com-
munity members (Adhikari 2005; Vyamana 2009; Ribot
et al. 2010).
Overall, it seems reasonable to argue that decentral-
ized forest management has delivered on its promises, in
particular on forest conservation. However, despite this,
progress on implementation has been slow. Even though
at least 35 developing countries have formal policies on
decentralized forestry, only a handful has seen large-scale
implementation in recent decades, i.e., Nepal, India, and
Tanzania. Furthermore, an assessment of forest tenure
reforms showed that a mere eight countries (Australia,
Bolivia, Brazil, Cameroon, Colombia, India, Sudan, and
Tanzania) accounted for almost the entire increase in the
forest area formally designated for and owned by com-
munities and indigenous people between 2002 and 2008
(Sunderlin et al. 2008).
The three challenges
Ironically, the conservation success of decentralized for-
est management reviewed above constitutes the first
challenge to the strategy of REDD+ through incentiviz-
ing further conservation of forests under such manage-
ment regimes. Ensuring REDD+ additionality will be
challenging in forests that are already being conserved.
This issue of additionality is underlined by the prob-
lem of leakage. The conservation of forests under de-
centralized management owes a lot to improved forest
replenishment and management that have increased for-
est growth such as tree planting and tending in, e.g.,
Nepal and India (Kauppi et al. 2006) and substitution and
reduced consumption of forest products among forest-
dependent people (Edmonds 2002; Lund & Treue 2008;
Chhatre & Agrawal 2009). However, studies have found
that, in many, yet not all (Baland et al. 2010), contexts,
the conservation of forests under decentralized manage-
ment is also due to displacement of forest clearance and
forest products extraction to other forests, i.e., leakage
(Chakraborty 2001; Pokharel & Nurse 2004; Vyamana
2009; Robinson & Lokina (2011)). Such leakage is a well-
known phenomenon from other area-based policy tools
directed at sustainable management and conservation of
forests, such as protected areas (Fearnside 2009; Pfeifer
et al. 2012) and forest concessions (Resosudarmo 2004;
Oliveira et al. 2007). Leakage has also been observed in
the first community-level forest-based carbon mitigation
project inMozambique (Jindal et al. 2012) and a REDD pi-
lot scheme implemented through community-based for-
est management in Tanzania (Robinson et al. 2013). Such
leakage is expected, as decentralization, and other area-
based initiatives aimed at conservation and sustainable
management, confers upon communities and other ac-
tors the rights to conserve and manage some, but not
all, forests. Furthermore, leakage does not undermine the
goals of area-based conservation, when concerned with
the preservation of place-specific ecosystem values or ser-
vices, e.g., water catchments, wildlife species, or biodi-
versity. Yet, leakage is a serious problem for REDD+ as
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it undermines additionality. This is the first challenge to
REDD+ through incentivizing conservation of forests un-
der existing decentralized management regimes.
The second challenge concerns size. As carbon se-
questration is a global public good, REDD+ should ar-
guably focus on protective measures that can assure large
emissions reductions to ensure efficiency, irrespective of
where this takes place. To this end, forests under decen-
tralized management, being generally many and small
in size, seem ill suited (Table 1). In Nepal, for instance,
17,685 forest user groups manage 1.6 m ha of forest,
implying that the average size of a decentralized for-
est is less than 100 ha. In Mexico, another prime forest
decentralization country, some 8,400 land owning Eji-
dos manage around 45 m ha of forest, implying an av-
erage forest size of 5,400 ha. Similarly, the 152 forest
commons from nine countries analyzed by Chhatre &
Agrawal (2008) feature an average forest size of 1,280
ha. Comparing these forest areas to the scale of global
deforestation indicates a magnitude of difference in scale
that appears relevant to the global scope of REDD+ pol-
icy. In Brazil, for instance, an estimated 200,000 ha was
deforested from August 2011 to July 2012, down from
270,000 ha the year before (Vaughan 2012). Making
REDD+ agreements with forestry user groups in Nepal
would entail transacting with more than 2,000 groups
in order to merely cover 200,000 ha. A recent review of
27 REDD+ projects located in four continents underlines
our point. Of the 27 projects, the larger were areas under
State management, mid-size projects were timber conces-
sions and private and indigenous reserves, and the (one-
third of 27) projects smaller than 10,000 ha were for areas
under individual household or community tenure, and
in these the project proponents bundled many house-
holds/communities under a single project to increase the
scale (IGES 2013).
Given their small-scale nature, implementation of poli-
cies to incentivize further conservation of existing de-
centralized forests is likely to result in limited carbon
mitigation at high cost. Evidence on the potential trans-
actions costs of REDD+ implementation remains limited
(Fisher et al. 2011; Thompson et al. 2013), but it seems ev-
ident that working with many and small collectively or-
ganized recipients of payments will drive up transactions
costs per ton of CO2 sequestered. Agrawal & Angelsen
(2009:206) argue that as “the amount of carbon se-
questered through any single community-based REDD+
project is likely to be small, cost-effective technologies to
monitor community forest carbon are critical to ensure
the success of REDD+ community projects.” Community-
based monitoring approaches have been highlighted as
cost-effective in the context of community-based for-
est management activities under the Clean Development
Mechanism (Skutsch 2005) as well as REDD+ (Larraza´bal
et al. 2012; Pratihast et al. 2013). Yet, in our view, the op-
timism displayed in these studies should be tempered by
the incentive problems associated with asking communi-
ties to surrender information, on the basis of which they
will receive REDD+ payments. This concern is voiced in a
recent study that illustrates how the production and com-
munication of information in a local monitoring system
in the context of decentralized forestry is used strategi-
cally to gain and maintain access to the benefits of the
management (Nielsen & Lund 2012). Furthermore, trans-
actions costs are driven by more than monitoring as indi-
cated by the standard reference to “monitoring, report-
ing and verification” (MRV) in the REDD+ literature.
However, transactions costs associated with payments to
communities would also involve regular interactions with
individual communities to draw up contracts, settle dis-
putes, and deliver payments, and so forth.
The third challenge concerns what goes on outside the
“conservation islands” represented by forests under de-
centralized management. Globally, the rate of deforesta-
tion is decreasing, but remains at a staggering net 13
m ha per year during 2000–2010 (FAO 2010). Interest-
ingly, net deforestation also occurs in the countries that
are seen as global leaders in decentralized forest manage-
ment (Table 1). Nepal, Tanzania, and Mexico have seen
net forest losses over the past decade. And while India
saw an increase in forest cover by 3 m ha (4.66%) during
2000–2010, this was mainly driven by the establishment
of new tree plantations, whereas the existing, natural for-
est cover was in decline by 1.5–2.7% per year (Puyravaud
et al. 2010). Arresting net forest loss at the national level
appears more urgent for REDD+ than seeking to squeeze
out a marginal extra biomass accumulation of forests un-
der existing decentralized management regimes.
Rights as the hard currency of REDD+
The current REDD+ strategy of targeting forests under
existing decentralized management, adopted by a num-
ber of countries, appears beset with challenges. Forests
under decentralized management are already seeing con-
servation and are, in all likelihood, generating leak-
age thus challenging REDD+ additionality. Furthermore,
they are many and small, and around them deforestation
and forest degradation continues.
Why do we then see this focus in REDD+ policy and
practice in a number of countries? The answer could be
seen in connection to the fact that decentralization ef-
forts have focused on degraded and/or low value forests,
i.e., forests that were of little or no interest to power-
ful actors at the national level (Ribot et al. 2006, 2010;
Mustalahti & Lund 2010). By targeting these same forests,
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Table 1 Statistics from five global leaders in decentralized forestrya
Number of Average forest Share of total Annual forest Change in
decentralized size per forest area under area change forest area
management management decentralized rate during during
Country Program units unit (ha) management (%) 2005–2010 (%)b 2000–2010 (%)
India Joint forest management 112,816 218.47 36.02 0.21 4.66
Nepal Community forestry 17,685 93.45 45.45 0 − 6.77
Philippines Community-based forest
management
1,786 907 21.14 0.73 7.7
Mexico Ejidos (local communities) 8,400 5,400.17 70 − 0.24 − 2.92
Tanzania Community-based forest
management and joint
forest management
2,323 1,775.72 12.34 − 1.16 − 10.77
aData for India are computed and based on FAO (2010) and ICFRE (2010), for Nepal on FAO (2010) and GoN (2011), for the Philippines on FAO (2010) and
Phelps (2010), for Mexico on Klooster & Masera (2000) and FAO (2010), and for Tanzania on FAO (2010) and Blomley et al. (2011).
bAnnual rate of gain/loss in percent of the remaining forest area within the period 2005–2010 (FAO 2010).
current REDD+ efforts pose no immediate threats to such
actors. Yet, this runs a risk of spelling failure for REDD+
in these countries and leaves the host of communities
with no tenure rights to forests disenfranchised. There-
fore, we argue that REDD+ efforts in these countries
should be redirected toward expanding the area under
decentralized forest management, thereby making for-
est rights the hard currency of REDD+. This could hap-
pen through financing of reforms to expand the forest
areas under decentralized management, which would al-
low forest administrations in developing countries to im-
plement existing, well-known policies, for which imple-
mentation guidelines and routines are in place. Further-
more, to alleviate transactions costs, adjustments to ex-
isting policies could be made; such as giving higher pri-
ority to the creation of larger management units, i.e., de-
volving larger, or several smaller, adjacent, forest areas to
one management body. Whether such adjustment would
come with a cost in the sense of lower management effec-
tiveness remains an empirical question; while some stud-
ies have found an increasing likelihood of conservation
with increasing forest area under decentralized manage-
ment (Chhatre & Agrawal 2009; Persha et al. 2011), other
studies have not found any relation (Agrawal & Chha-
tre 2006), or have come to the opposite result (Chha-
tre & Agrawal 2008). Yet, there are studies from several
countries showing that communities are able to conserve
larger forest areas (e.g., ancestral forests in the Philippines
[Balooni et al. 2008; Villamor & Lasco 2009], indigenous
and extractive forest reserves in Brazil [Schwartzman et
al. 2000], and forest-owning ejidos in Mexico [Bray et al.
2003]).
The relationship between forest size on one hand and
management costs and livelihood outcomes on the other
has received scant attention in the literature. In their
study of the forest revenues of 42 community-forestry
user groups from Nepal, Chhetri et al. (2012) find no rela-
tion between the size of forest area without valuable tim-
ber species and revenue income, but a highly significant,
positive relation between the size of forest area with valu-
able timber species and revenue income. They also show
that higher revenue income implies a financial surplus
above and beyond forest management costs that is in-
vested in locally important public infrastructure and ser-
vices. Similarly, the study by Persha et al. (2011) indicates
that larger decentralized forests are more likely to have
joint positive outcomes on conservation and livelihoods,
in the sense of the share of the community membership
that use the forest. In sum, the existing evidence does
not allow us to draw clear conclusions about the relation-
ship between size of forest under decentralized manage-
ment and outcomes, although there are indications that
Nepal’s community forests could be managed more ef-
ficiently under larger management units (Chhetri et al.
2012).
A strategy of expanding the area under decentralized
forest management and seeking to establish larger man-
agement units in the process cannot be the only strat-
egy for REDD+ in the countries mentioned. Some forests
will be too remote for community management to make
sense. Yet, in Nepal, for instance, only around one-third
of the area identified as suitable for community forestry
has been handed over (Pokharel et al. 2012). Similarly, in
Tanzania, less than one-fourth of the more than 10,000
villages in the country are formally involved in decentral-
ized forest management, and only a subset of these have,
in fact, had their management rights officially recognized
by the relevant authorities (Blomley & Iddi 2009).
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We do acknowledge that expansion of the forest area
under decentralized management is part and parcel of the
vision of REDD+ policy in the countries mentioned in
this article. Yet, in current policy and, not least, practice,
we see few indications of these visions becoming reality.
Furthermore, such expansion was a clear policy ambi-
tion already decades ago, at the inception of decentral-
ized forest management. Yet, the history of policy reform
and implementation shows that these ambitions were not
met (Sunderlin et al. 2008). Forest tenure reforms set out
in policies and legislation stumbled in implementation
as donor interest dissipated and the practical difficulties
of seeing through, for instance, processes of land regis-
tration as a preparation for forest mapping and titling,
became apparent (Doherty & Schroeder 2011). REDD+
risks becoming a tragic, if not farcical, repetition of these
draped-over reform attempts. Therefore, we urge the in-
ternational donor community, NGOs, researchers, com-
munities, governments, and other actors with an interest
in REDD+ to use the current momentum and financial
muscle to push forward such implementation. Such an
approach, where forest rights become the hard currency
of REDD+, to us, constitutes the right way forward for
REDD+.
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